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The program to immunize 210 million Americans against swine flu failed. It set back the Federal
government's relations with state health agencies, private physicians, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the
insurance industry. It increased mistrust of immunization programs and of government health programs in
general.
The well-intentioned plan had far-reaching consequences because its scope and the speed with which itwas
implemented were overreactions to the threat. Its size magnified every one of its faults, legal, medical and
political. Organizational and scientific capacity were less than expected. Local health agencies could not
administer the program with the inadequate funds from HEW and pharmaceutical companies could not
produce a safe, effective children's vaccine.
Because of the urgency given the program, Congress neglected the opposition ofconsumer advocates and
state health officials, and did not spend time trying to include immunization against childhood disease in the
swine flu program.
The failure illustrates the dangers of hasty decisions, ofconsidering only direct medical costs and benefits
and not social and political effects on health policy, of launching a public health program whose scientific
basis is weak and whose administrative requirements are untested.
The swine flu immunization program is over. There was no epidemic and as ofJuly
5, 1977, the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC) reported that about 45 million
people had been vaccinated against swine influenza. The Center had originally hoped
to immunize 210 million.
There are two indications that the program failed, a direct one that can be
recognized today and an indirect one that bears on future mass immunization
campaigns. First, the goal of vaccinating more than 210 million Americans did not
even come close to realization. The national program began October 1, 1976. It was
halted December 16, 1976, because about 200 people had come down with Guillain-
Barre syndrome, a very rare and usually temporary paralysis [1].
The second effect is harder to pinpoint. But indications are that public mistrust of
all immunization programs, and perhaps public health programs in general, is
increasing. The backlash is ironic because when Congress was debating the program
many of its proponents wanted to use it as a vehicle to promote immunization
programs for childhood diseases [2]. They hoped to increase consciousness of
vaccines of all kinds, make the swine flu program a showpiece for preventive
medicine, and demonstrate how well the federal government could cooperate in
health matters with private practitioners, with state and local services, with volun-
teers, and with drug manufacturers [3].
The plan backfired. The newsletter ofthe N.Y. County Medical Society blasted the
program as "a classic example ofwhat can happen when politicians play around with
the delivery of health care" [4]. When Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, fired Dr. David Sencer, director of the CDC and a vigorous
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supporter of the swine flu campaign, his action was viewed as an attempt to make
Sencer the scapegoat for the program's failures [5]. Americans are more skeptical not
only about the need and value ofimmunization, but also about its safety. Finally, the
program failed to boost other immunization efforts.
The paradox is that the program might have been hailed as a great success in
preventive medicine if a significant number of swine flu cases had been isolated last
winter. There were only three laboratory isolations of the virus, however, and
evidence ofjust a few more [6]. Because the program seemed unnecessary, it may be
more difficult to convince people of the danger of the next incipient epidemic: the
swine flu program attracted such wide press coverage that the public health.establish-
ment was made to look overly alarmist.
The program also set back the relationship between private doctors, state health
agencies, medical scientists, pharmaceutical companies, and the federal health bu-
reaucracy. Physicians did not actively support the drive; some discouraged vaccina-
tion [7]. State agencies felt the government's financial aid was inadequate [8]. With
closer scrutiny of the program have arisen charges that its directors acted more with
an eye toward politics than toward epidemiological necessity . . . or that big govern-
ment had the capacity to do something and therefore did it, without first evaluating
the need for the program or its scientific basis.
This criticism is after the fact, but that is due in large part to how quickly the
program passed Congress, to who made the decisions and had a special interest in
seeing the program enacted. The following timetable indicates the speed with which
the war against swine flu was launched:
January 1976: Swine flu breaks out at Fort Dix, N.J.
February 14, 1976: The CDC identifies the virus as swine flu.
March 10, 1976: The CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
agrees that a vaccine should be produced and a plan developed to administer it. It
does not recommend mass immunization.
March 13, 1976: Sencer writes an action memorandum recommending mass
vaccination of 200 million Americans against swine flu.
March 24, 1976: President Gerald Ford, flanked by Jonas Salk and Albert Sabin,
urges the nation to initiate a campaign to immunize "every man, woman, and child in
America."
March 26, 1976: Ford sends to Congress the Administration's request for $135
million in supplemental appropriations for a national swine flu immunization pro-
gram.
March 30, 1976: The House Subcommittee on Appropriations (Labor and HEW)
holds hearings on the bill.
March 31, 1976: The House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment holds
hearings.
April 5, 1976: The bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize and
regulate the influenza immunization program is introduced in the House. It passes by
voice vote.
April 6, 1976: The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the
Appropriations Committee, hold hearings.
April 9, 1976: The appropriations bill passes the Senate with amendments for other
programs.
April 12, 1976: The House agrees to the Senate amendments.
April 15, 1976: Ford signs the bill, now P.L. 94-266.
This legislative history is extremely short, but the time pressure was emphasized
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from the beginning and reiterated by almost every witness at the congressional
hearings: a decision had to be reached quickly ifthe vaccine were to be manufactured,
tested, distributed and administered before the start of the flu season. HEW officials
needed a decision before April 1, they said, to give industry time to develop a vaccine.
Development required four to six months, and the start of immunization was slated
for October 1, 1976 [9].
The time pressure was derived in large part from the lessons ofprevious pandemics
and immunizations. While the program was debated, health officials kept drawing
parallels with the 1918-19 pandemic of swine flu as well as with more recent
epidemics to illustrate the seriousness of the disease and to remind legislators what
the public health establishment can and should do to prevent epidemics.
The 1957 Asian flu and the 1968 Hong Kong flu reached epidemic proportions
because even though enough vaccines were available, they were not administered in
time. In 1957 49 million doses ofvaccine were ready before the epidemic peaked but
half were never used. There were delays indistributing it to local healthagencies and,
more important, there was no public response to the immunization campaign [10].
The need to rally citizen support for an immunization drive was recognized early on.
Medical considerations added to the time pressure. Flu symptoms appear three
days after infection with the virus. But seven to 10 days are required for a vaccine to
stimulate production of antibodies that provide immunity against swine flu [11]. On
March 30 Sencer testified before Rep. Paul Rogers' (D.-Fla.) Subcommittee on
Health and the Environment, warning that if immunization did not begin until
November or December the program's chance of success would be zero. Immunizing
a population already exposed to flu, with chances ofexposure increasing in winter, is
impossible.
Congress did not want to be accused of delaying a program that Ford and his
medical advisors insisted was crucial and had to start immediately to succeed. Its
decision to appropriate $135 million is only half the legislative history, however.
Funds had to be approved so drug firms could begin makingvaccine and local health
departments could organize themselves to administer it. Because P.L. 94-266 passed
so quickly, there was little chance to oppose the initial appropriation.
Opposition surfaced later. On June 28 Rogers held supplementary hearings be-
cause of criticism of the program that had arisen since April. But by June the
program was moving, and moving quickly. Four drug companies were producing
vaccine; clinical trials had been run to ascertain the correct dosage and see if the
vaccine caused side effects; states had applied for project grants and were organizing
volunteers and public health workers for the mass immunization effort.
The second half ofthe legislative history unfolded over the summer, culminating in
the passage of P.L. 94-380 which established the national swine flu program and
provided an exclusive remedy for injury or death arising from any phase of the
program [12]. Controversy surrounded both provisions. First, the program was
questioned on medical grounds. Critics said flu vaccines had been notoriously
ineffective in the past. They have always been less effective than smallpox, measles
and polio vaccines [13]. Second was a broaderpolicy question pertaining to allpublic
health programs-the question ofliability. Court decisions in 1968 and 1974 had held
drug manufacturers responsible for warning patients about vaccines used in commu-
nity health clinics. In the absence of the usual doctor-patient relationship the manu-
facturer was liable for injury resulting from his vaccine [14].
The pharmaceutical firms therefore demanded insurance to protect them against
such claims as well as the anticipated barrage ofbaseless damage suits arising out of
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the ambitious program [15]. In a drive of this extent there would inevitably be
patients breaking out in rashes oreven suffering heart attacks after inoculation. Since
the two events were associated in time the patient might blame his reaction on the
vaccine and sue the manufacturer.
But their insurance companies cancelled coverage for flu vaccine. The pharmaceu-
tical firms therefore insisted the government indemnify them. Other program partici-
pants also asked for protection against liability and malpractice suits [16]. The April
bill left the liability question unresolved. Assistant Secretary for Health Dr. Theo-
dore Cooper warned that the success of the program would bejeopardized ifliability
coverage were not included in the final bill [17].
By midsummer, then, the program faced serious legal questions. The liability
question and the publicity it attracted hurt the program indirectly as well: people
became suspicious and fearful of the new and untried vaccine that no one was willing
to insure.
There were medical problems, too. The clinical results were unsatisfactory. Emi-
nent scientists like Salk and Sabin disagreed on how to run the program. Cooper
insisted the medical problems would be solved; he pushed for a rapid decision. As
Sabin testified on June 28, Congress was damned ifit passed the bill and damned ifit
didn't. The lawmakers could not ignore the politicalconsiderations, either. They were
told the vaccine posed no medical risks; they vastly preferred to tolerate unnecessary
health expenditures than unnecessary disease and death ... especially in an election
year.
Who was involved in the decision, what issues they faced, when controversies
erupted-all explain the form of the final bill. The January 1976 outbreak of swine
flu at Ft. Dix, a basic training camp, was identified as a mild form ofswine influenza.
An army investigation showed that 500 out of 12,000 recruits were infected and
clinically ill [18]. More serious, the virus was transmitted from person to person and
not from swine to person. This was the first case of humans being infected without
having been exposed to diseased swine and therefore presented the possibility of a
fast-spreading epidemic [19]. Other findings disturbed the CDC.
The swine flu strain appeared and disappeared in a few weeks, leaving behind the
A-Victoria strain which had circulated in the winter of 1975-6. Could similar small
outbreaks of swine flu have gone undetected, seeding the population with that viral
strain? Others asked, so what ifundetected outbreaks had been occurring foryears? If
they have not caused an epidemic yet, why should they do so now [20]?
Swine and A-Victoria flu were circulating in the same population ... was swine flu
replacing the old strain? Or was it too weak to compete with otherstrains and become
prevalent, and therefore presented no danger [21]?
The 1976 swine flu virus had similar surface antigens to the virus that killed some
20 million people in the 1918-19 pandemic [22]. Because such an antigenic strain had
not appeared for over 50 years, only a small fraction of the population was immune
to it. Salk called this an immunity gap and based hisjustification of the program on
it. He argued that people under 50 lacked the protective antibodies necessary to
prevent infection if the 1918-like strain reappeared [23].
Others questioned the analogy with 1918. Many ofthose deaths were attributed to
secondary pneumonia, and the virus hit a population weakened by the European war
and was spread by overcrowding and troop movements. And 60 years ago there were
no antibiotics against secondary infections like pneumonia [24].
The CDC feared the continuation of a historic pattern. Flu pandemics had
occurred about once a decade (1946, 1957, 1968) and in each case had followed
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antigenic shifts in influenza A [25]. (After antigenic shift, the sudden and complete
change in a virus's antigens, antibodies protective against the old strain are useless
and epidemics can start.)
The Ft. Dix strain showed no exceptional virulence, however [26]. The one recruit
who died from it would probably have survived had he not left his sickbed to embark
on an army march [27]. Furthermore, 12 people in New Jersey died ofA-Victoria flu,
but that virus was not called a "killer," as was. the swine strain [28].
The fifth scientific issue was the success ofvaccines. Vaccines stimulate production
of antibodies that neutralize the virus before it can enter millions of body cells.
Because the antibody response is highly specific, to induce production of the right
antibodies the patient must be injected with the viral strain that appears.
How successful had flu vaccines been? Different estimates appeared in the press
and at the congressional hearings. Cooperclaimed theyare 90 percenteffective if"the
infecting virus matches the virus used in the vaccine" [29]. Other advocates said they
can protect 70 to 80 percent of recipients [30]. Dr. Sidney Wolfe of Ralph Nader's
Health Research Group countered that they had been shown 20 to 70 percent
effective in past tests [31]. The head of the Bureau of Biologics admitted it is
"questionable whether the use of vaccine had any detectable effect in either 1957 or
1968" [32].
Flu vaccine fails for two reasons. It is defective if its virus does not match that
spreading through the population. The 42 million doses given in 1962 were only 20 to
25 percent effective because virologists incorrectly predicted the strain that appeared,
so the vaccine was not tailored to cope with that virus [33].
The 1957 and 1968 vaccines, however, would have worked if enough people had
received them. The other reason a flu vaccine fails is the inability ofthe health care
system to organize itself in time to deal with a fast-spreading virus and to convince
people to get shots.
Because the new strain was identified early, the first reason forpossible failure was
minimized. Congress and HEW had to evaluate how well the vaccine would work, of
course, but they faced the more difficult task ofdeciding how well the public health
establishment could run a program whose goal was to vaccinate 210 million people
and of publicizing the need to receive the vaccine.
The speed with which the program was to be implemented presented unique
problems. Opponents warned of the dangers ofa crash production program and, in
fact, Parke-Davis made two million doses ofvaccine before the CDCfound they had
used a 1931 strain instead of the 1976 virus [34]. On June 21, 1976, the CDC
discovered that the vaccine produced by all four manufacturers lacked one of its
active components. The ideal flu vaccine should trigger the production ofantibodies
to do two things: hemagglutinin to stop the virus from penetrating cells, and
neuraminidase to stop it from multiplying and spreading even ifitdoes penetrate cells
[35].
The program's administrators asserted this loss was not serious. But as Phillip
Boffey asked in Science, "Whatelse could they say?That must be their stand with 150
million doses lacking it" [36]. Production was too far along for the manufacturers to
examine their process to find where they had lost the second active component.
The Bureau of Biologics had, meanwhile, begun field trials with 5,000 volunteers to
determine the vaccine's efficacy. Subjects ranging in age from 3 to 100 were given
either the vaccine or a placebo. One dose gave most adults the desired antibody
response with few side effects. It was remarkably easy to immunize people over 24,
said the CDC. But of the four vaccines produced, two produced the antibody
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response in 90 percent ofthe adults while the other two produced it in only 75 percent
[37]. The vaccines were neither uniform nor perfect.
Worse problems arose with younger recipients. Only half of those between 18 and
24 responded adequately to the dose effective for older adults. In children from 3 to
10, no dose gave enough protection without also inducing side effects ranging from
headaches to convulsions [38].
This defect was serious because school-age children are the principal spreaders of
flu. If they could not be immunized the entire program might fail-once swine flu
appeared it would probably be impossible to prevent it from spreading so widely and
quickly it would reach epidemic proportions [39].
Beyond determining the efficacy of the vaccine, the risks and benefits of the whole
program had to be evaluated. What gets lost in post facto arguments is that the
likelihood of a pandemic was never judged substantial even by the program's
advocates. Most believed the odds were against an epidemic. Testifying before
Rogers' subcommittee on March 31, Cooper only said there was "a good likelihood"
that the Ft. Dix virus would cause flu during the September-to-March flu season. Dr.
Harry Meyer of the Bureau of Biologics concurred that there was a possibility of a
major epidemic, but not a certainty of one. Dr. Richard Krause of the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases noted that the 1976 strain was very
similar to the 1918 virus, but he could not conclude that the 1976 form was equally
deadly or contagious.
But the success of the campaign should not have depended on a catastrophic
outbreak of swine flu. Instead, expanding the program into a wider immunization
effort would have provided a more rational, more lasting measure ofsuccess, such as
the number of children protected against polio, diphtheria, and tetanus.
Congress nevertheless appropriated the $135 million with the full realization that
the chances of a large outbreak of swine flu were remote. They made the decision by
balancing the risks and benefits of the mass immunization program. Any time such
an evaluation is used to determine a course of action, one assumes all risks and
benefits are taken into account. But in the swine flu decision some costs were
overlooked, because the decision came so quickly and did not reflect the views of
groups it might have, like consumer advocates and local health officials.
The April hearings represent the point of no return. By August Congress was
understandably reluctant to question the wisdom of its earlier decision. By then it was
easier to go along with the program, faults and all.
At the House hearings in March, the unanimity on the need for the program was
complete. Cooper stressed the enormity of the 1918 pandemic [40]. Sencer added,
"Never in the past have we isolated a completely new strain of flu that has not been
followed by an epidemic flu" [41].
Through the rest of Cooper's testimony runs a subtler argument. One question
asked about swine flu is why this strain differed from other emergent strains. There is
never any resistance to a new strain. So what justified the great plans for a program
that would dwarf the polio program of the 1950s? Why did HEW want to vaccinate
210 million people instead of the 40 million high-risk people they usually do?
The swine flu program was different because the government made it different. It
seized the opportunity to launch a major campaign because it felt the country had the
scientific and organizational capacity for it and because identifying a new virus seven
months before the flu season gave virologists their first chance to match vaccine to
emerging virus.
Said Cooper on March 30: "For the first time we have received a warning" about
650FAILURE OF THE 1976 SWINE FLU DRIVE
what flu strain would spread through the population, and there was the opportunity
and ability to prevent it. "We have the technology to try and do something" [42]. In
NaturalHistory, Dr. Edwin Kilbourne wrote that the rationales for the program were
that early recognition of a new viral strain had, for the first time, given epidemiolo-
gists the chance to modify the course of an incipient epidemic, and also that the
production of 200 million doses of vaccine was feasible [43].
Success seemed assured. Cooper promised Congress that industry would cooperate
fully, and that private and state health care delivery systems could provide the
capability and be organized in time to administer vaccine. He argued that the
program would be a good opportunity for private medicine, volunteers, and govern-
ment to work together. Perhaps this carpe diem enthusiasm was best captured by the
urging of Prof. Hingson of the University of Pittsburg to realize "the great dream of
mass immunizing an entire population challengedby a preventable epidemic" [44].
In opposing testimony, Sen. Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass.) called for expanding the
program to other diseases [45]. Rogers said he was not satisfied we "shouldn't make
the optimum effort (to vaccinate against other diseases) as long as we're going to the
trouble ofmobilizing the entire nation" [46]. But Rep. Tim Carter (R.-Ken.) admon-
ished his colleagues not to "clutter up" this important piece of legislation [47].
Cooper responded that the data on combined vaccines were inadequate and that
changing needles and determining who was at the clinic for what shot would be an
institutional nightmare. Hepromised the immunization apparatus could stay in place
for use in other preventive medicine programs [48].
He did not limit his arguments to the direct benefits of a swine flu vaccine or
assume there would be anepidemic without it. He also pointed out that even a limited
outbreak would burden the health system. He cited indirect benefits, too: the pro-
gram would increase awareness of preventive medicine, and its high visibility would
make parents find out if their children's immunization was complete [49].
Other opposing testimony raised legal and logistics questions, but not medical
ones. Predicting future problems, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America
warned that the government must indemnify them against liability for the quality of
the vaccine since it was being produced according to strict government specifications
[50]. State officials expected massive financial problems: although they planned to
mobilize volunteers, they still feared they would be unable to run the swine flu
program without crippling their other health programs [51].
But the spring hearings ended. On April 5 Rogers spoke for the bill on the House
floor, arguing that the small amount ofmoney involved was justified even though no
one knew ifanepidemic would occur. A favorite phrase was that it is better to gamble
with dollars than with lives. The only debate was on combining this with other
immunizations, but the proposal received little support. The appropriation passed;
the bill also provided that state and local health agencies would receive the vaccine
free [52].
Up to this point there had been little mention of the program's risks. Although
statements that the capability to do something might justify doing it suggest the
program was notexactlynecessary, the worst conclusion one could draw was that the
need was manufactured for institutional reasons. Health bureaucrats saw it as an
opportunity to boost immunizations and preventive medicine. Scientists welcomed
the chance to learn more about flu vaccine and the response to it. The drug industry
wanted to show it could cooperate with other health-care sectors in a spirit ofpublic
service and not profit. Politicians were vying for the role ofprotector ofthe health of
the American people.
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These reasons are self-serving, perhaps, but they are not dangerous and still leave
the conclusion that the program carried no risks. It was cheap and the vaccine was
safe. It had potential benefits-indirect if not direct-even if it was not absolutely
necessary.
What is absent from this analysis is medical fact about swine flu and flu vaccine,
and evaluation of the program's effect on immunization policy and of the precedent
that Congress would set by indemnifying the program participants. Both the medical
evidence and the liability question hit Congress early in the summer.
The clinical trials begun in April showed the vaccine did have medical faults, the
most serious being the problem immunizing children. Another argument was how to
measure vaccine potency. The usual measure is chick cell agglutination (CCA) units.
But increasing potency, or CCA units, did not increase antibody production in
volunteers. And manufacturers arrived at different potency measures, for the same
lot of vaccine, than the Food and Drug Administration [53].
These two medical problems forced some rethinking ofthe program. In contrast to
April when Congress heard almost no opposition to the program, the midsummer
hearings aired many conflicting opinions.
Part of the difficulty with legislating science or medicine is that few Congressmen
know enough about these fields to reach independentjudgments. They must rely on
experts. Dilemmas arise when two immunologists or two epidemiologists disagree. A
recent example is the recombinant DNA controversy in Cambridge, Mass. Faced
with one group of scientists swearing the research was safe and necessary, and
another group warning that it would reopen Pandora's box, the City Council
admitted it had to make a political decision, not a scientific one. It imposed a
moratorium on the research.
This sort ofquandary engulfed Congress in the swine flu debate. Its decision, too,
was, in the end, a political one.
Congress took testimony on the need and safety of the vaccine from almost every
sector of the health industry. Cooper maintained that although the question of
whether an epidemic would strike was still unanswered, there had never been a major
antigenic shift in flu virus that had not been followed by an epidemic [54]. Wolfe
charged Cooper was telling only half the story: several sporadic outbreaks ofthe new
flu as well as antigenic shift had to precede anepidemic [55].Six years earlier, Walter
Dowdle of the CDC had written that antigenic shifts were not always followed by
epidemics, and he concluded that antigenic shift alone was insufficient to cause
epidemics. Kilbourne had reported this finding to Ford in March, but it was not
brought to Congress' attention in April.
Sabin advocated immediate immunization ofhigh-risk groups only, including the
elderly and chronically ill for whom flu could be fatal. He recommended stockpiling
the rest untilpotencyrequirements were known and a safe vaccine were developed for
children [56].
Salk followed Sabin andargued unequivocally in favor ofthe program as it was set
up. He spoke for preventive medicine and filling the immunity gap, and said Ameri-
cans should see the results of biomedical research they have been funding [57].
Three articles in Lancet added to the conflicting scientific opinions. They disputed
the seriousness of the threat and the efficacy of flu vaccines. One reported an
experiment in which six volunteers were inoculated with the new virus. All became
infected but had only mild reactions. In addition, the virus did not seem disposed to
spread since when introduced into a closed community of young people it did not
replace Victoria virus as the prevalent strain [58].
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Another British scientist disputed the 1918 analogy. The ability to cause disease is
carried by viral genes separate from those determining surface antigens. Comparison
of surface antigens therefore says little about virulence [59].
A physician concluded the virus was notvery good at infecting man. Since only 500
out of 12,000 recruits at Ft. Dix got swine flu, and none were immune to it, the
infection stopped spreading long before all those susceptible had been infected [60].
What could Congress do with conflicting expert opinion? Perhaps if it had been
heard in April Congress would have approved a less ambitious program. But now
there was more concern with keeping the program running than with going back to
question its rationale. And there remained the nagging doubt that there might be a
deadly epidemic. Kennedy supposedly said, "I hate this bill. But what if there is a
swine flu epidemic? They'll blame me."
Even Wolfe, opposing the program for medical reasons and charging it would
immunize people for whom the risk exceeded the benefit, realized Congress would
not revoke its original decision. The legislators were trying to salvage as much ofthe
program as possible, set precedents for other public health efforts, and place swine flu
in the context of other health legislation. It might have accomplished this by making
the program a vehicle for a comprehensive immunization program for childhood
diseases.
The issue embodying all three concerns was the liability question. Insurers refused
to write policies on the swine flu vaccine. The drug companies would not release
vaccine without liability coverage. They worried not about injury from the vaccine
(medical risks to adults were near zero) but about a spate of baseless damage suits
that would cost a fortune to litigate. They estimated legal costs could reach $25
billion [61].
The liability dispute threatened to stop the program before it began. According to
the insurance industry, however, withdrawal of coverage was the effect and not the
cause of the program's problems. They claimed that coverage was withdrawn because
of the scale of the program: when 210 million people are to receive an unknown
vaccine it is impossible to make any sensible risk assessment or to avoid a flood of
spurious suits alleging injury from the vaccine [62].
Thus the medical issues impinged on the legal issues, which affected implementa-
tion of the program. If swine flu had been treated like any new viral strain, if health
officials immunized high-risk groups first but were more circumspect about vaccinat-
ing an entire nation and had secured more data on the virus, then perhaps Congress
would not have voted a huge program threatened by many meritless damage suits.
Because medical evidence that might have restricted the program's scope was ig-
nored, the legal issue arose. Liability raised more problems: it held up HEW's
contract negotiations with the pharmaceutical firms, delaying production and distri-
bution of vaccine.
Although insurance companies said they cancelled coverage for swine flu vaccine
because ofthe large number ofpotentialrecipients, there was some suspicion that this
was just the first step out of the unprofitable public health area.
But the insurers pointed to the program's high visibility and unprecedented scope
and foresaw many allegations of injury. Whether they had merit or not, such suits
cost a lot to defend. The government had made this flu program different from any
other. In doing so it created problems no other had faced and set undesirable
precedents for future public health legislation.
Congress' solution was for the government to assume primary liability. Claims
would be filed exclusively against the U.S. If the government lost the suit due to a
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drug company's negligence, it could sue the company to recoverdamages awarded by
the court. The program participants, from the vaccine manufacturers to the nurses
swabbing the arms of patients, were liable only for damages caused by their own
negligence but were protected from the cost ofdefending baseless damage suits [63].
The bill establishing the swine flu program and liability coverage passed both the
House and Senate on August 10, 1976, and was signed into law by President Ford
two days later. But the plan still faced so many problems that Rogers held further
hearings on September 13. The liability question had delayed the program six weeks;
two companies had slowed or stopped vaccine production because the CDC had
failed to specify the number of doses it required and had been late in delivering
formula and labeling specifications. Medical questions, including potency measure-
ments and the antibody level needed to provide immunity, were still unresolved.
Because the biological nature of the vaccine was unsuitable for everyone in the
population, Cooper conceded they no longer hoped to vaccinate everyone.
His prediction was good. The program began October 1. By October 11 three
people had died after receiving the inoculation and by the thirteenth 35 people in 17
states had died [64]. The CDC protested that none of the deaths could be blamed on
the vaccine, but because the government had made the program such a showpiece,
the deaths attracted an unusual amount ofpress coverage. The death blow fell when
200 people who had been vaccinated contracted Guillain-Barre syndrome. The
immunizations were halted December 16. Nineteen and three-tenths percent of the
population had received the vaccine.
It is not difficult to see why the program failed. Immunologists could notdevelop a
safe effective vaccine for children. The scope of the program gave it a visibility that
magnified each of its problems, from insurance companies withdrawing liability
coverage (which made the country wonder how safe the vaccine could be if no one
would insure it) to people dying after being vaccinated. No one foresaw Guillain-
Barre. The government could not convince its citizens thevaccine was necessary. The
emphasis was wrong: Congress eagerly mounted ahuge campaignagainst one disease
that was not certain to appear but would not "clutter up" the legislation with
provisions for a national immunization program against childhood diseases.
Why did Congress pass it? At the spring hearings it decided that even the smallest
possibility of a pandemic, causing substantial illness and death and straining the
nation's health apparatus, alone justified an inexpensive program that carried, it
seemed, no risk at all.
But because the medical data on flu are incomplete, Congress could not recognize
all potential risks. Also, Congress failed to look at the program as part of a national
immunization policy. Instead ofaiming the program at the fewest people possible, it
tried to include everyone. For only $135 million it could protect the nation from an
incipient epidemic of influenza, that last great plague to elude the control of medical
science. Not even fiscal conservatives could argue with that balance of cost and
benefit.
But the program did worse than fail. It set back the relationship between the
federal government and state health agencies, private practitioners, pharmaceutical
manufacturers, and the private health insurance industry. As the administration tries
to put together a national health insurance bill, these relationships must be strength-
ened, not broken. The swine flu failure may also have increased public mistrust of
immunization programs in particular and of preventive medicine in general. As the
public loses confidence in the scientific competence ofthe agencies ofthe Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, it resists warnings on the carcinogenicity of
saccharin, the uselessness of laetrile.
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Why such far-reaching consequences from a well-intentioned program that seemed
to have no risks, that wagered an insignificant supplemental appropriation against
the threat ofwidespread illness and death from swine flu? Its scope and the speed with
which the program was implemented were inappropriate to the threat. Instead of
immunizing only high-risk groups for whom flu can be fatal, HEW planned to
immunize every man, woman, and child in America. It planned a program of
unprecedented size because it felt the nation had the scientific and organizational
capacity to make it succeed.
But its size magnified every one of its faults-the errors resulting from crash
production ofvaccine, the inability to make a vaccine safe forchildren, the refusal of
private insurers to provide liability coverage for the vaccine, the lack ofenthusiasm
for the program shown by private physicians.
Its scope was justified by arguments ofcapability, necessity, and opportunity. But
capability was less than expected. Local health agencies were short of funds and
manpower; medical data on flu and flu vaccine were incomplete; a safe children's
vaccine eluded the drug firms. Necessity was questioned both by American physicians
like Albert Sabin and Sidney Wolfe and by the British health establishment repre-
sented in Lancet. The opportunity presented by the isolation of a new viral strain
seven months before the flu season was a questionable base on which to establish the
ambitious program.
The urgency given the program by HEW pressured Congress into a hasty decision.
It neglected the opinions ofconsumer advocates and state health officials, and felt it
could not afford to waste time studying how to include immunizations against
childhood diseases in the swine flu program. Including such a provision might have
salvaged at least part of the program even if the swine flu part failed.
The failure of the swine flu program shows the dangers of reaching too-quick
decisions, ofa vision so narrow it considers only a program's direct medical costs and
benefits and is blind to its socialand political ramifications for future health policy, of
enthusuastic support for a public health project whose scientific basis is weak and
whose organizational and administrative requirements are untested.
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